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ABSTRACT

The past decade has witnessed a major revolution in social concern with animals.
Philosophically, this revolution entails a significant revision in traditional ways of
conceiving our m o d obligations to other creatures. Therefore, it is necessary to understand
the social and conceptual basis for what is widely termed “animal rights.” The agricultural
community has mistakenly tended to dismiss this new thinking as tkinge and emotionally
based. In actuality, it is a natural extension of earlier social thought. The case of new laws
regulating biomedical research illustrates the rapidity of social change in this area, as do
recent developments in European regulation of agriculture. The relevance of this new moral
thought to what has hitherto been understood purely in economic terms must be assimilated
by the American agricultural community before the agricultural community can respond
appropriately and non-reactively.
(Key Words: Animal rights, Animal Welfare, Ethics.)
J. Anim. Sci. 1990. 68:345&3461

The past decade has witnessed a major
revolution, both in degree and kind, in social
concern with animal welfare and the moral
status of animals. Although animal welfare
Concerns, and their codification in law, date
back at least 200 years, those concerns have
been addressed almost exclusively at cruelty.
The lowest common denominator ethic obtaining in society has traditionally been encapsulated in the anticruelty laws, which forbid
willful, intentional, malicious cruelty or wanton neglect, and which are as much designed to
protect society from sadists and psychopaths,
who begin with animals and move to people,
as to protect the animals. In these laws, harm
done to animals or suffering inflicted on
animals for human necessity-essentially defined in the broadest,possibleway as economic
benefit or even recreational benefit-is by
defition exempt from the anti-cruelty laws.
Thus, agriculture, animal research, hunting,
trapping, rodeo, all cannot fall under the
cruelty statutes.
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A nineteenthcentury case (Waters v. the
People) testing the Colorado statute, typical of
all of these laws, underscores this point. Under
the anticruelty law, suit was brought against a
group of individuals involved in the release
and shooting of tame pigeons. In dismissing
the case, the judge declared that
not every act that causes pain and suffering
to animals is prohibited. . . Where the end
or object is reasonable and adequate, the act
resulting in pain is necessary or justifiable . . . . The aim of this section is not
only to protect these animals, but to
conserve public morals (Rollin, 1981).
Surprisingly, perhaps, this same thinking
was dominant in the traditional humane or
animal welfare movement, whose major categories were kindness to animals, cruelty to
animals, and love for animals. This in tum led
to the selective concern for animals that is
manifest in the federal Laboratory Animal
Welfare Act of 1966 (P. L. 89-544jmoral
concern tended to be restricted to the cute and
cuddly. The Animal Welfare Act was promulgated for anthropocentric reasons, i.e., to
reassure pet owners who feared their pets
would be kidnapped and sold to research
laboratories (U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 1986). For purposes of
this act, a dead dog is an animal whereas a live
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mouse, rat, sheep or pig is not. By the same
token, the humane movement devoted little
attention to animal agriculture, save for concern about humane slaughter and cases of
patent neglect, e.g., underfed or improperly
sheltered livestock, and occasionally rodeo,
which was perceived as involving unnecessary
suffering. The “normal” raising of animals for
food was not an issue for the vast majority of
humane organizations, and very few advocated
a vegetarian lifestyle.
The term “humane” bespeaks the idea that
moral concern for animals is not an obligation
for humans but a gift we bestow. It also led to
an unfortunate tendency on the part of animal
welfare people to stigmatize all those who
cause animal suffering as cruel people-those
opposed to animal research are forever characterizing scientists as sadists and psychopaths.
The basic principles of animal rights thinking are a major departure from these traditional
categories of kindness and cruelty. First of all,
most harm perpetrated on animals and most
animal suffering is not a result of cruelty, but
rather grows out of “normal”animal use. Thus
most researchers are not cruel, they do not
enjoy hurting animals; they are not sadists,
they have high ideals and noble aims; yet they
use millions of animals annually and cause a
great deal of harm and suffering to them.
Similarly, most agriculturalists, hunters and
trappers are not cruel, yet their activities can
result in suffering. This point was well
understood by a New York State judge a few
years ago who heard a case in which a group
of animal rights attorneys attempted to prosecute the use of the steel-jawed trap for trapping
under the anticruelty laws (Animal Legal
Defense Fund v. Depaxtment of Environment
Conservation, 1985). In dismissing the case,
the judge remarked that were it within his
power to do so, he would ban the steel-jawed
trap today. But the way the animal cruelty laws
are written, they do not cover things like the
steel-jawed trap that are aimed at satisfying a
human “need“ (fur in this case) and at
economic benefit. Therefore, he added, the
only way to address such cases is to change
the law through legislation. So one basic
feature of animal rights thinking is to concern
itself with animal suffering, whether or not the
source of that suffering is cruelty, which
typically it is not. This example also explains
why a major thrust of rational animal rights
thinking is toward new legislation, governing
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the myriad practices involving animals to
which the notion of cruelty is irrelevant and
inadequateparadigm cases are animal research
and agriculture.
Second, and by the same token, the proper
treatment of animals is seen in animal rights
theory as a demand of justice andfairness,not
as a matter of kindness or good will (Rollin,
1981; Regan, 1983; Sapontzis, 1987). m
s is
true even of philosophers who philosophically
question the cogency of “rights” [Singer,
19751.) Just as the women’s movement would
not accept as a slogan “be kind to women,” so,
too, the new animal movement rejects kindness
as the relevant categary. The feeling is that
moral obligations to animals follow logically
as an inevitable extension from moral ideas we
already have about people in society. In this
way, animal rights is an extension of 1960s
thinking, by which concern with the rights of
minorities and women was seen not as a new
idea being thrown out for discussion, but as
necessarily following from ethical principles
already taken for granted in society in our
moravlegal system.
In my own work on animal ethics, I realized
early that there is little point in trying to bully
those who use animals, be it in science,
agriculture, or some other discipline, into
accepting my opinions. After all, why should
they care about whether what I say is right or
wrong? As Socrates said, philosophers cannot
teach, only remind. In my own martial arts
metaphor, I thus use j& rather than sumo,
attempting to extract something like my ideas
from my opponent’s own assumptions, rather
than attempting to butt heads with them
(Rollin, 1990).
Far more effective than head-on collision is
the ability to demonstrate that the seeds of the
position one is attempting to press on one’s
opponent are, in fact, already contained in the
opponent’s own position, albeit implicitly and
in an unrecognized way. I will briefly summarize this approach.
The first point to emphasize is that, despite
an inherent tendency on our part to magnify
and stress differences in the ethical positions
among diverse persons in a society, the
similarities and agreements in ethical principles, intuitions, practices and theories that
obtain in society far outweigh the differences.
This is true for many reasons. In our society,
most of us are brought up and steeped in the
same Judaeo-Christian, democratic, individu-
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alistic heritage. In addition, we live under the
same set of laws, which encode much of that
morality in ways guiding and shaping our
theories and practices. And finally, it is evident
that we could not live and function together if
we did not implicitly share a very sisnificant
set of moral guidelines. This point is typically
unnoticed precisely because it is always there
and it works. What is noted and remembered
are the situations in which it doesn’t work and
in which we are greatly dividebissues like
capital punishment or perhaps abortion, though
abortion, in my view, involves more of a
metaphysical dispute than a moral one, because all parties presumably would acquiesce
to the same moral principles governing taking
human life; the debate concerns what counts as
human life.
In any event, we share something of a
consensus ethical ideal for the treatment of
human beings that pervades our thinking and
that governs our laws and social policy. This
ideal is not difficult to articulate in outline: In
democratic societies, we accept the notion that
individual humans are the basic objects of
moral concern, not the state, the Reich, the
Volk, or some other abstract entity. We
attempt to cash out this insight in part by
generally making many of our social decisions
in terms of what would benefit the majority,
the preponderance of individuals, i.e., in
utilitarian terms, what is of greatest benefit to
the greatest number. In such calculation, each
individual is counted as one; thus, no one’s
interests are ignored. But such decision making
presents the risk of riding roughshod over the
minority in any given case, e.g., by suppressing an unpopular speaker. So democratic
societies have developed the notion of individual rights, protective fences built around the
individual that guard him or her in certain
ways from encroachment by the interests of
the majority @workin, 1977).
These rights are based on plausible hypotheses about human nature, i.e., about the
interests or needs of human beings that are
central to people, and whose infringement or
thwarting matters most to people (or, we feel,
ought to matter). So, for example, we protect
freedom of speech, even when virtually no one
wishes to hear the speaker’s ideas, say in the
case of a Nazi. Similarly, we protect the right
of assembly, choosing one’s own companions,
one’s own beliefs, and also the individual’s
right not to be tortured even if it is in the

general interest to torture, as in the case of a
criminal who has stolen and hidden vast
amounts of public money. All these rights are
not simply abstract moral notions, but are built
into the legal system. Thus, the notion of
human nature is pivotal to our ethic-we feel
obliged to protect the set of needs and desires
that we hypothesize as being at the core of
what it means to be human.
The obvious question that arises is what this
has to do with animals. The answer is simple.
If one can show that there are no rationally
defensible grounds for differentiating animals
from humans as candidates for moral concern,
we must logically bring to bear upon questions
of animal treatment the entire moral machinery
we use to deal with human questions. This
does not force the conclusion that animals are
equal to people in moral value, but rather that
our treatment of animals must be judged by the
same moral categories we use to judge our
treatment of people, weighed by the same
scales. In short, animal rights thinking attempts
to extend our consensus social ethic to animals
(Rollin, 1981).
As I have argued elsewhere at length, there
are no rationally justifiable grounds for excluding animals from the moral arena, even as it
has been shown that there were none for
excluding such traditionally neglected humans
as women, blacks, and children. None of the
standard reasons offered up in the history of
thought for excluding animals from the moral
arena will stand up to rational scrutiny. Such
allegedly relevant differences as the claim that
animals lack immortal souls, do not reason,
lack language, are inferior to humans in
strength or intelligence, are evolutionarily
inferior or are incapable of entering into
contracts all tum out to be either false or lack
the requisite degree of moral relevance that
would justify not considering animals morally.
For example, consider the claim that we can do
as we wish with animals because we are
superior to or more powerful than them. This
claim amounts to “might makes right,” and if
we invoke it here, we also must accept the
claim that the government has the right (not
just the power) to do to us what it sees fit, or
that the mugger or rapist is morally justified in
exploiting his victim, because governments
and muggers are more powerful than those
they oppress (Rollin, 1981).
Equally important, one can argue that not
only are there no morally relevant differences
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for excluding animals from moral concern as
we in society define it, there are significant
morally relevant similarities that animals share
with humans.
The same sorts of features that we find in
people and that give rise to our talking about
right and wrong actions with regard to people
are also to be found in animals. The features to
which I am referring that are common to
people and to as least “higher” animals (and
possibly “lower” ones as well) are interestsneeds, desires and predilections,the fulfillment
and thwarting of which matter to the person or
animal in question. Cars have needs-for gas,
oil, and so on-but they do not have interests,
because we have absolutely no reason to
believe that it matters to the car itself whether
or not it gets its oil. That is why it is
impossible to behave immorally toward c m they are merely tools for human benefit. But
animals with interests cannot be looked at as
mere tools, for they have lives that matter to
them.
There are, of course, categories of interests
and interests that are common to all animals
(including humans), such as food, reproduction
and avoidance of pain. But even more significant are the unique variations on these general
interests, and the particular interests, which
arise in different species. Even as we talk of
human nature, as defined by the particular set
of interests constitutive of and fundamental to
the human animal, we can also talk of animal
natures as well-the “pigness” of the pig, the
“dogness” of the dog. Following Aristotle
throughout his writings, I like to talk of the
relos of different species of animals as being
the distinctive set of needs and interests,
physical and behavioral, genetically encoded
and environmentally expressed, that determine
the sort of lives they are suited to live (Rollin,
1981). This is not a mystical notion. It follows
directly from modem biology and genetics,
and it is certainly obvious to anyone who is
around animals and, indeed, is common sense
(hence the song that tells us that “fish gotta
swim and birds gotta fly”).
Recall that we have argued that our
consensus ethic for humans protects certain
aspects of human nature deemed to be
essential to the human relos, and shields them
from infringement by the majority and even by
the general welfare. If it is the case that one
can find no morally relevant grounds for
excluding animals from the application of that
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ethic, and if animals too have a relos, it
follows inexorably that animals too should
have their fundamental interests encoded in
and pmtected by rights that enjoy both a legal
and moral status. In this way, we indeed
illustrate that the notion of animal rights is
implicit (albeit unrecognized) in our consensus
social ethics.
Thus, to summarize, the animal rights view
attempts to apply the moral notion we all share
about people to animals, and to encode basic
protection for fundamental aspects of animals’
natures into law.
The effectiveness and influence of this new
way of thinking about animals is manifest in
new legislative changes all over the world. For
example, consider the two new (1985) US.
federal laws governing the use of laboratory
animals, namely the so-called Dole-Brown
amendments to the Animal Welfare Act (P.L.
99-198), and the so-called Health Research
Extension Act (P.L. 99-158). In essence, these
laws affirm the rights of laboratory animals to
be free from pain and suffering not essential to
a piece of research, and also affirm some other
rudimentary rights for non-human primates
and dogs: Dogs have a right to exercise and
primates have the right to be housed under
conditions that “enhance their psychological
well-being.” And it is my prediction that,
eventually, husbandry of laboratory animals
will be legislated so as to require accommodation of the animals’ natures, for scientific as
well as ethical reasons (Rollin, 1990). Similar
laws for research animals have been enacted in
Britain, Holland, and elsewhere.
Though application of t h i s ethic has focused
Grst on science in the U. S., its extension to
agriculture is inevitable, and, indeed, this
already has begun in Europe. The paradigm
case, of course, is the new legislation in
Sweden, which even uses rights language in its
erosion of confinement agricultural practices
we take for granted and in its granting cattle
the right to graze (New York Times, 1988).
But Sweden is not an isolated, deviant
exception. Other legislative restrictions on
mnfinement agriculture have been put in place
elsewhere in Scandinavia, as well as in
Germany, Holland, and Switzerland. The EEC
and the Council of Europe have moved toward
abolition of battery cages and other confinement techniques, and have devoted a great deal
of attention to this issue (Grommers, 1988). In
Great Britain, dehorning and castration without
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anesthesia after 8 wk of age have been banned
since 1981, and in January of 1987, the
Minister of Agriculture announced an eventual
ban on veal crates (Grommers, 1988). In
Germany, a recent govemment report recommended that German society should move
away from intensive agriculture for health and
environmental reasons, as well as for reasons
of animal welfare. Throughout the European
legislative and parliamentary discussions surrounding this issue, emphasis was placed on
the ethical dimensions, in accordance with the
notion of matching environments to animal
natures (Ewbank, 1988). This whole moral
stance with regard to farm animals is perhaps
best summed up in a statement made by the
federation of EEC veterinarians (FVE), hardly
a radical group, not long ago: “It is clear to us
that changes in systems to benefit food animals
may mean higher cost to consumers. That is
the price a civilized society should be prepared
to pay” (Grommers, 1988).
If the EEC does adopt restrictions on
confinement, this could lead to a rejection of
U.S. products not meeting these standards.
In the face of the patently moral basis of
this new concern for animals in general and for
farm animals in particular, it is a mistak+and
a non-sequitur4o respond that confinement
agriculture has produced cheap and plentiful
food and economic efficiency. The animal
rights advocate need not deny this (though
some would cite environmental and health
costs of confinement agriculture, currently a
major concern in Europe). What they would
argue is that these economic benefits have
come at the expense of the animal, and this is
wrong. Indeed, the rise of confinement
agriculhm-the application of industrial
methods to animal agriculture-was a major
stimulus to the development of animal rights
thinking, especially in Britain. The advent of
technology has allowed us to put square pegs
into round holes, to keep animals under
conditions to which their natures are not
suited, without the wholesale devastation that
would have occurrd years ago before the
technology was developed. But nonetheless,
the animals pay a major price, in behavioral
anomalies, production diseases, and disturbance and frustration of their telos (Fox,
1984). As we all know, moral values check
profit and economic efficiency in many areas;
we don’t allow child labor and condemn child
pornography even though they both may be
very productive economically. And in the

universities, it is clearly more “efficient” to
teach thousands of students via videotape and
computer, what is lost is quality.
What the animal rights philosophy, and
increasingly, society as a whole, are demanding is that moral concern for animals serve as a
check on efficiency exacted at the cost of
animal welfare. And society is willing to pay
for it. It is estimated that enforcing the Animal
Welfare Act for research animals alone costs
$500 million, with much more spent to satisfy
NIH requirements. The traditional definition of
“necessary suffering” as suffering that is
inconvenient to alleviate is moving toward
social redefinition as suffering that is impossible to alleviate.
What ought the role of the animal scientist
be in response to the growing prevalence of
the sort of ethic we have outlined? (Bear in
mind that this sort of thinking seems to be
becoming mainstream, not “fringe,” and that it
is to society as a whole that animal users must
account.) In the fist place, agricultural
sciences should avoid the mistake made by
biomedical science a decade ago when it
responded to a burgeoning thrust for federal
legislation protecting laboratory animals with a
vigorous denial that there was any need for
legislation. For example, in a debate with me
before 1,OOO people held at Colorado State
University in 1981, Dr. Grafton, representing
the National Society for Medical Research,
resoundingly declared that “there is nothing
questionable done to any animal in any
medical or veterinary school in this country”
(Grafton, 1981). NIH had no mechanism for
enforcing its own guidelines nor any desire to
establish one. Those of us in Colorado who, in
1977, had drafted the model legislation that
eventually became the 1985 federal laws, were
vilified (Ironically, the majority of our group
were laboratory animal veterinarians and researchers who saw clearly that the lack of any
d o m e d regulation was morally, socially, and
scientifically unacceptable.) I was called an
apologist for lab trashers and an exonerator of
the Nazis in the New England Journal of
Medicine (visscher, 1982). Of course, as
public opinion developed and grew in favor of
legislation and when the University of Pennsylvania head-injury tapes and other atrocities
became public, the research community
reversed itself, and was glad that we had
articulated viable legislation based on enforced
self-regulation.
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Unfortunately, it is difficult for many
animal scientists to relate to the evolving ethic
on animals. In the first place, like biomedical
scientists and most other scientists, they have
been trained under an ideology that suggests
that science is, and ought to be, “value-free,”
and thus ethical issues are not within the
purview of scientists. (This is fully discussed
in Rollin, 1989.) Suffice it to say that animal
science, like all other sciences, is not valuefree, but rests on many valuational assumptions, including moral ones; an obvious example in that it is morally justifiable to kill or
hurt animals for food Second, the socioethical demand that we back off from the
search for ever-increasing efficiency flies
directly in the face of the traditional mandate
for animal scientists-that they develop the
wherewithal to produce greater amounts of
food efficiently and cheaply. To many animal
scientists, this new ethic is thus tantamount to
a repudiation of their life’s work.
The key point, however, is that science is
not value-free, but is driven and guided by
social values. And, in my view, society is now
demanding that efficiency be subordinated to
the proper treatment of animals in accordance
with the sort of ethic we have sketched and
that this be encoded in law. It thus behooves
the animal science community, as the scientific
arm of animal agriculture, to provide s o c i q
and legislators with the information pertaining
to making rational, informed decisions on the
issues relevant to such legislation. In this, the
U.S. animal science community has lagged
considerably behind other countries; in Britain
and on the Gmtinent, in Canada and New
Zealand, extensive work has been done on
farm animal ethology in relation to ethics. A
vast and rich literature has been created abroad
by scientists like I.J.H. Duncan, B. 0. Hughes,
M. Dawkins, G. Van Putten, W. Sybesma, R.
Kilgour, A. Fraser and others. In the US.,
relatively few farm animal ethologists engage
these issues and those that do are woefully
under-funded.
Sweden is nor Mars; the Atlantic is a
shrinking ocean that ideas cross with great
speed. Recent laboratory animal legislation
bespeaks the growing hold of the ideas we
have outlined on mainstream thinking and
demonstrates their ingression into the legal
system. As long ago as the 1960s, the
Brambell Commission in Britain essentially
advocated some fundamental rights for farm
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animals (Brambell, 1965) that are regularly
violated in our confinement systems. US.
society will soon demand that agriculture back
off, at least to some extent, from confinement
and pay greater attention to agricultural animal
comfort and happiness, and encode this demand in legislation. It would behoove agriculture in general and animal science in particular
to anticipate this and to use is expertise to help
formulate such law, rather than to play Russian
roulette with its fum by placing the responsibility for legislation in the hands of those who
are jll-equipped by background and training to
formulate reasonable policy. This critical juncture should best be perceived not as a threat,
but rather as an opportunity to reaffirm and r e
emphasize the husbandry that is historically at
the root of both animal agriculture and animal
science.
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